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ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing from the agency and stewardship theory literature, this conceptual work explores the role of 
intrapreneurship (internal corporate venturing) in multi-generational family businesses.  Specifically, 
governance and managerial considerations unique to family businesses are used to predict both the 
relatedness between a parent firm and its ventures, and how these internal new ventures are managed.   
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Intrapreneurship in Multi-Generational Family Businesses 
 
ABSTRACT 
Drawing from the agency and stewardship theory literature, this conceptual work explores the 
role of intrapreneurship (internal corporate venturing) in multi-generational family businesses.  
Specifically, governance and managerial considerations unique to family businesses are used to 
predict both the relatedness between a parent firm and its ventures, and how these internal new 
ventures are managed. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  Internal corporate ventures (ICVs) are entrepreneurial initiatives that originate within a 
corporate structure and are intended from their inception as new businesses for the corporation 
(Sharma and Chrisman, 1999).  By leveraging their resources in new business domains, 
corporations practicing internal corporate venturing can benefit from increased firm growth 
(Thornhill & Amit, 2001; Tidd & Taurins, 1999), enhanced financial performance (Miles & 
Covin, 2002; Simon, Houghton, & Gurney, 1999), diversification (Sorrentino & Williams, 1995; 
Tidd & Taurins, 1999), the building of new competences (McGrath, 1995; Tidd & Taurins, 
1999), and improved innovativeness (Day, 1994; Simon et al., 1999).  Nonetheless, the history of 
ICV practice indicates that firms often fail in their attempts to create viable new businesses 
(Campbell, Birkinshaw, Morrison, & van Basten Batenburg, 2003). 
  The reasons why firms fail in their ICV efforts are varied; though commonly involve 
venture mismanagement (Ginsberg & Hay, 1994).  For example, ICVs are frequently targeted at 
business domains that are not well understood or where the parent company has no expertise 
(Zahra, Nielsen, & Bogner, 1999), unrealistic strategic objectives are established according to 
planning processes appropriate only for more established businesses (McGrath & MacMillan, 
1995), parent companies exert too much or too little control over their ICVs (Thornhill & Amit, 
2001), and parent companies often fail to protect ventures from outside interference as the 
ventures struggle in their nascence (Burgelman & Sayles, 1988).  In spite of the challenges of 
internal corporate venturing, Burgelman & Valikangas (2005:29) stated that it is “a strategic 
leadership imperative for top management to learn to better manage the ICV cycle” because of 
the strategic advantages they portend.  Additionally, Guth & Ginsberg (1990:13) stated that 
“research that contributes to increasing the frequency and success of corporate entrepreneurship 
will, in our view, be highly valued in the academic and practitioner communities.” 
  The research of Hitt, Nixon, Hoskisson, & Kochhar (1999) suggests that organizational 
context considerations (e.g., top management team support, organizational politics) have a 
significant influence on the performance of corporate entrepreneurship initiatives, of which ICVs 
are one manifestation.  Unlike other new businesses, ICVs exist not only within an external 
competitive context but also within the organizational context of the corporate parent, and so 
they frequently find themselves interacting with the other parent-corporation subunits and 
managers (Garvin, 2002).  In the case of an ICV, the ability to pursue a creative idea within the 
context of an existing organization – to mobilize resources in support of its development and to 
bring it to fruition – is invariably affected by features of the organizational context (Dobrev & 
Barnett, 2005).  However, there is a paucity of research on the unique organizational context of a 
parent firm and the effect of that context on venturing strategies and subsequent ICV 
performance. 
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  Family businesses represent a unique context to investigate internal corporate venturing 
strategies.  Family businesses have been defined as firms which consist “of the vision held for 
the firm by a family or a small group of families and the intention of the dominant coalition to 
shape and pursue this vision, potentially across generations of the same family or group of 
families (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999: 35).   This definition focuses on the attitudes of the 
various family members towards the future ownership and management of the business, 
attempting to transcend quantitative measures characteristic of other definitions and is further 
captured in discussions distinguishing between the essence versus components approaches (see, 
Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003; Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Zellweger, Eddleston, & Kellermanns, 
2010. In line with Kelly, Athanassiou, & Crittenden (2000), the definition is rooted in the notion 
of family ownership and control along with the desire to pass ownership and control to future 
generations.  Family businesses that desire to grow - whether for the objective of generating 
more profit or for offering greater employment opportunities for family members – face the same 
challenges as those confronted by large diversified firms attempting to venture (Brockhaus, 
1994).  However, there is little research that has attempted to examine these issues from the 
perspective of family businesses (Poza, 1988).  For example, the influence of the CEO in a 
family business may have an exceptionally strong effect on what kinds of ventures are pursued 
and how they are managed.  Additionally, the involvement of subsequent generations in the 
family business may determine the extent to which the firm must grow to support additional 
families and, subsequently, the amount of strategic rejuvenation that must occur within the 
business.  Finally, many family businesses look to external board members as valuable sources 
of information and guidance on business practices, and thus these board members may further 
affect the dynamic of family business internal venturing.  In short, the unique dynamics of family 
and non-family influences on a family business produce a very unique context to investigate 
what kinds of ICVs are pursued and how they are pursued. 
While this manuscript touts the context of the family business as a potentially fruitful 
domain for research on internal corporate venturing, it remains important to acknowledge here an 
ongoing debate in the literature regarding whether family businesses behave entrepreneurially 
and demonstrate risk-taking behaviors or if they avoid taking risks and pursuing new 
entrepreneurial initiatives due to a preference to maintain the status quo.  Some of the literature 
on family businesses shows that some family firms become conservative, unable or unwilling to 
take entrepreneurial risks (Dertouzos, Lester, & Solow, 1989).  This strategic rigidity may be 
because the founders of family firms are trying to build a lasting legacy and are wary of the 
perceived high risk of failure in entrepreneurial ventures (Morris, 1998), with the accompanying 
risk of destroying family wealth (Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997).  Additionally, agency 
theory has been applied to the family firm to argue that family control inhibits firm growth 
because they are less likely to fund innovative ventures due to inefficient risk bearing, more 
likely to engage in managerial entrenchment, and more likely to seek wealth preservation 
through political lobbying (Carney, 2005; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Since family CEOs typically 
stay on the job three to five times longer than non-family business CEOs (Lansberg, 1999; Ward, 
2004), they may take a farsighted long-term perspective that makes them hesitant to engage in 
risky expedients such as hazardous acquisitions or unrelated entrepreneurial initiatives, which 
could produce great wealth for the family (Amihud & Lev, 1999; Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; 
Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990).   
On the other hand, some researchers argue that the long-term nature of family firms’ 
ownership allows them to create and invest in highly productive dedicated resources required for 
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innovation and risk-taking (Dyer, 1996; Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004).  Furthermore, family 
firms uniquely possess kinship-ties that are believed to have a positive effect on entrepreneurial 
opportunity recognition (Barney, Clark, & Alvarez, 2003).  These opportunities are then pursued 
because owner-managers understand that the family-firm’s survival depends on leveraging new 
markets, creating new businesses, and increasing the distinctiveness of the firm’s products 
(Ward, 1987; Zahra, 2003; Zahra et al., 2004). Specifically, stewardship theorists (e.g., Davis, 
Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997) propose that stewardship theory should be considered a 
complementary governance perspective to agency theory. The interests of principals and agents 
can be aligned when the “stewards” of an organization are motivated through a combination of 
positive organizational actions and cooperative interests which reside outside of personal wealth 
maximization. With a dual focus on the individual psychological behaviors of the steward and 
the situational contexts of the firm, stewardship theory describes the benefits organizations 
receive when their executives are motivated to act in the best interests of their principals (Davis 
et al., 1997). An emphasis on intrinsic rewards such as opportunities for growth, achievement, 
affiliation, and self-actualization are examples of stewardship behaviors. The extrinsic versus 
intrinsic focus is a major distinction between stewardship and agency theories, with the steward’s 
motives coordinated with the objectives of the principals, or in this case the family. Following 
this logic, a steward has a greater proclivity to identify with their firm, and, therefore, the 
steward sees the firm as an extension of themselves. In contrast, the agent often does not share 
this same affinity toward their organization (Brown, 1969). More specifically, stewards benefit 
when they demonstrate commitment to making a significant contribution to their firm’s mission, 
financial performance, and survivability, more so than their personal economic self-interest 
(Davis et al., 1997). When principals and their stewards are mutually accountable, their goals and 
motivations are aligned. 
In the context of ICVs, stewardship theory permits scholars to further explain the possible 
role this strategy may have on family businesses.  Drawing on the role of stewardship theory in 
family firms (Dibrell & Craig, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006), family businesses will 
embrace ICVs, as it will enable them to extract resources from the organization’s bundle of 
resources from existing businesses owned by the family and from the family itself.  Additionally, 
ICVs allow the steward manager to more aptly align their goals with those of the family 
business, as it keeps the steward engaged in the family business instead of being concerned with 
the extraction of wealth from the family business, which may put the survival of the family 
business in jeopardy.  
While recent literature has attempted to resolve the debate through empirical examination 
of the antecedents to family business corporate entrepreneurship (e.g., Kellermanns & Eddleston, 
2006; Salvato, 2004), scholars and practitioners alike still know relatively little about how 
corporate entrepreneurship is conducted within a family business and what unique attributes of 
family businesses differentiate the conduct of entrepreneurial initiatives in this context from that 
of the large diversified firm.  The scholarly discussion summarized above regarding whether or 
not family businesses behave entrepreneurially is thus rooted in two primary factors: CEO 
behaviors and family member involvement in the business.  The research question of this 
manuscript is not whether family businesses are entrepreneurial, but rather among those family 
businesses that are entrepreneurial, how do the CEO and other family members affect what kind 
of entrepreneurial initiatives are pursued, and how they are managed.  By specifically focusing 
on internal corporate venturing, the new business initiatives adopted by the firm, this research is 
able to distinguish how related those new businesses are to the family firm (what kind of 
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initiatives), and the degree of managerial autonomy they are granted by the family firm (how 
they are managed).  By including the effects of external board members on the venturing 
process, this research provides a more complete governance picture of the family firm. 
Prior research on internal corporate venturing has demonstrated the importance of parent-
venture relatedness and venture autonomy on subsequent ICV performance.  Tanriverdi & 
Venkatraman (2005) found that knowledge relatedness was positively correlated with 
performance in multi-business firms.  Focusing specifically on the field of corporate venturing, 
Campbell et al. (2003) find that among the units they studied that were set up to develop 
significantly new businesses for the parent company (named “new leg” ventures by the authors, 
indicating little to no relatedness between the parent and the venture), none were successful.  
Sorrentino & Williams (1995), however, had previously found in their quantitative analysis no 
significant relationship between relatedness and ICV performance, leading them to postulate that 
perhaps the relationship between relatedness and performance is contingent on other venture-
related considerations.   
One such consideration is venture autonomy, or the amount of independence allowed to 
the venture by the parent company.  Simon et al. (1999) argue that ventures pursuing newer, 
experimental markets require a great deal of freedom.  Contrarily, ventures operating in 
relatively familiar domains for the parent firm may benefit from increased monitoring to avoid 
costly mistakes.  Furthermore, the research of Kuratko, Covin, & Garrett (2009) finds a 
significant positive correlation for the direct effect of venture planning autonomy on ICV 
performance.  While the relationships of these two variables – parent-venture relatedness and 
venture autonomy – with subsequent ICV performance may be complex, previous research has 
indicated their importance and proximal effect on performance.  Thus, the current conceptual 
examination’s aim of understanding the effects of family business governance considerations on 
venture relatedness and autonomy is an attempt to fill a knowledge void in the literature 
regarding these two constructs instrumentally important to ICV performance. 
  This manuscript is structured as follows.  First, propositions are developed regarding the 
conduct of internal corporate venturing in family businesses as informed by theory and previous 
research in the domains of both family business governance (i.e., agency and stewardship) 
considerations and corporate venturing.  Then, conclusions are presented along with implications 
for theory and practitioners of internal corporate venturing. 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
  The governance of family businesses is primarily composed of the CEO, the involvement 
of subsequent generations or other family members beyond the founder, family members who do 
not work in the family-owned business but have a stake in the family-owned business, and 
external board members.  The following theoretical development, reflected in Figure 1, explores 
the effects of these constituent parts of a family business on what kinds of ICVs are pursued in 
terms of parent-venture relatedness and how those ventures are managed by the parent company. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Conceptual Model 
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Parent-Venture Relatedness 
 
The concept of relatedness has been explored within multi-business firms using a variety 
of dimensions in the construct of relatedness, for example: product relatedness (Rumelt, 1974), 
manufacturing relatedness (St. John & Harrison, 1999), technological relatedness (Robins & 
Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 1999), and marketing relatedness (Capron & Hulland, 1999).   
Relatedness as used in the research domain of internal corporate venturing has to do with the 
strategic fit between the parent and its ventures and is posited to benefit the venture by increasing 
venture access to the parent’s resources (Thornhill & Amit, 2000; Sorrentino & Williams, 1995).  
For ICVs, which are typically early-stage business experiments for the parent corporation (as 
opposed to mature businesses in a large diversified company), the most important resources 
possessed by the parent are product development and market knowledge resources because ICVs 
frequently operate in product-market domains adjacent to those of the firm’s established 
businesses (Birkinshaw, van Basten Batenburg, & Murray, 2002; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; 
Thornhill & Amit, 2001).  Thus, the definition of parent-venture relatedness used in this 
manuscript focuses on product and market similarity between the parent and venture.  Parent-
venture relatedness is the extent to which the venture is similar to other businesses of the 
corporation in terms of the products/services offered and the markets targeted by the venture.  
This definition is consistent with Kurakto et al.’s (2009) conceptualization of market/product 
similarity between ICVs and their parents. 
Sound venturing strategy dictates that parent companies typically venture in domains that 
are adjacent to the firm’s core businesses (Birkinshaw et al., 2002).  While this strategy attempts 
to minimize down-side risk, it also potentially limits up-side gain and growth.  While family 
firms are initially based in innovative ideas, they often lose their entrepreneurial momentum after 
 
Parent-Venture 
Relatedness 
 
Venture 
Autonomy 
 
Generational 
Involvement 
 
External Board 
Members 
 
CEO Tenure 
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a few years (Salvato, 2004) and the CEOs begin to make more conservative decisions in order to 
minimize the risk of failure in their ventures and the risk of losing family wealth (Morris, 1998; 
Sharma et al., 1997).  This loss of entrepreneurial momentum can translate into low amounts of 
corporate entrepreneurship for first-generation family firms (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006), 
and thus high degrees of relatedness in the ventures that are pursued. 
However, as subsequent generations get involved in the business, the need for rapid 
growth and diversification becomes more necessary in order to support a larger number of people 
in the family business (Poza, 1989).  Indeed, family businesses owned and managed by multiple 
generations must rejuvenate and reinvent themselves, if they are to maintain the same level of 
financial performance of the previous generation (Jaffe & Lane, 2004).  In sum, subsequent 
generations in family businesses tend to push for new ways of doing things (Kepner, 1991; 
Moores & Barrett, 2003), including creating new products and services and reaching new 
markets (Sharma et al., 1997).  Thus, the family firm is directed to less related ventures as 
subsequent generations get involved in the ownership and management of the business. 
 
Proposition 1:  The involvement of subsequent generations in a family business will be 
negatively associated with parent-venture relatedness. 
 
While generational involvement is proposed to increase the amount of unrelated 
venturing in a family business, this relationship may be affected by other governance 
considerations of the family business.  First, the CEO of the family business plays a strong role 
in the strategy of the family business.  The research of Kelly et al. (2000) found that CEO 
centrality – the degree to which the CEO is central to the top management group network – 
strongly effects the strategic vision, goals, and behavior of the family firm.  Of many various 
CEO characteristics (e.g., knowledge, ownership stake, control, and centrality) studied in the 
literature, CEO tenure specifically has been found to influence the type of investments 
undertaken by the family firm (Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). 
The lengthy tenure anticipated by CEOs of family firms leads them to take a farsighted, 
steward-like perspective of the business (Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009).  This perspective makes 
them reluctant to engage in unrelated diversifications because of the increased risk attributed to 
these activities (Amihud & Lev, 1999; Morck et al., 1990).  Additionally, when the CEO’s tenure 
is long, his or her knowledge of the company tends to be deep (Miller & Shamsie, 2001), and so 
they become entrenched in the dominant logic of the business and therefore become less likely to 
pursue endeavors not tightly linked to the core competencies of the firm.  Thus, CEO tenure acts 
to mitigate the tendency of subsequent generations to purse unrelated ICVs within the family 
business.  CEOs with longer tenures in a family business will act to “correct” the influence of 
younger generations by ensuring that ICVs pursued are not highly disparate from the core 
businesses of the firm. 
 
Proposition 2:  CEO tenure positively interacts with generational involvement in the 
family business such that the negative relationship between generational involvement and 
parent-venture relatedness will be diminished when CEO tenure is longer than when it is 
shorter. 
 
  Family businesses often procure external board members to gain objective insights into 
the management of their company.  The three primary roles of board members are control, 
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service, and resource dependence (Johnson, Daily, & Elstrand, 1996).  The control role of board 
members includes monitoring managers to make sure that they do not expropriate stockholder –
in this, the family – interests (Monks & Minow, 1995).  This monitoring may include ensuring 
that firm resources are preserved for activities related to the primary business objectives of the 
firm instead of unrelated venturing activities.  Additionally, external board members are often 
recruited to fulfill the resource dependence role, providing resources complementary to the core 
businesses of the firm (Johnson et al., 1996).  Because of their expertise and knowledge in the 
core businesses of the company, they may be less likely to approve of managerial decisions that 
detract from the core businesses, thus reducing the degree to which unrelated ventures are 
pursued.  Thus, 
 
Proposition 3:  External board members positively interact with generational 
involvement in the family business such that the negative relationship between 
generational involvement and parent-venture relatedness will be diminished when there 
are more external board members than family internal members. 
 
Venture Autonomy 
 
Venture autonomy has been found to be among the strongest predictors of ICV success 
(Kurtako et al., 2009).  Because ICVs seek to develop a whole new business specifically tailored 
to enter new and emerging markets (Block & MacMillan, 1993), they often require their own 
unique organizational structure, culture, and systems (Simon et al., 1999).  Previous research has 
identified three primary types of autonomy important to ICVs (Kuratko et al., 2009).  First, 
venture planning autonomy is the extent to which the venture’s management is responsible for 
establishing goals, timetables, event milestones, and strategy for the venture; as opposed to 
corporate parent management having those responsibilities.  Second, venture operations 
autonomy is the extent to which the venture’s management team is responsible for the design of 
the venture’s internal operations.  Last, venture operations independence is based on the 
organizational positioning of the venture and is the extent to which the venture’s operations are 
linked to those of the other businesses of the corporation. 
Venture-level self determination with regard to strategic management decisions like goal 
selection, strategy formulation, and performance criterion establishment may be positive for 
venture performance because venture-level management often has the best knowledge of how to 
strategically lead their business, while parent-level management  may have less complete, 
accurate, or timely information (Kuratko et al., 2009).  However, this logic applies best only 
when the knowledge of parent-level managers is not applicable to the ICV, such as when the 
ICV is sufficiently unrelated to the parent’s businesses.  When the venture is related to the 
parent’s businesses, it is reasonable that the parent will possess adequate and appropriate 
knowledge and expertise to gainfully participate in the venture’s strategic decisions.  Thus, 
related ICVs will manifest lower levels of venture autonomy, while unrelated ICVs will manifest 
higher levels of venture autonomy. 
 
Proposition 4:  Parent-venture relatedness is negatively associated with venture 
autonomy. 
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  However, the role of the CEO in the family firm may affect the nature of the relationship 
between parent-venture relatedness and venture autonomy.  CEOs of family businesses are 
obviously entrepreneurial, especially if they are also the founder; they have already recognized 
one business opportunity and exploited it through the creation of the family venture (Aldrich & 
Cliff, 2003).  As the CEO’s tenure increases, his/her knowledge of the company deepens (Miller 
& Shamsie, 2001), and he/she grows more confident in his/her ability to manage and control it 
(Milliken, 1987).  This increased confidence in ability to manage a business may combine with 
the passion of the CEO to act entrepreneurially such that the CEO tends to play a bigger role in 
unrelated ICVs than indicated previously.  Thus, although unrelated ICVs may benefit from 
more autonomy, and typical management practices may follow this prescription, the CEO with a 
long tenure in the family firm may grapple with the temptation to become overly involved in 
unrelated ICVs.  In essence, the temptation of entrepreneurial behavior may be too much for the 
tenured CEO to resist. 
 
Proposition 5:  CEO tenure positively interacts with parent-venture relatedness such that 
the negative relationship between parent-venture relatedness and venture autonomy will 
be diminished when CEO tenure is longer. 
 
Campbell, Goold, & Alexander (1995) postulate that a parenting advantage exists when a 
corporate parent possesses the resources and expertise to benefit its businesses.  Where no 
parenting advantage exists, Campbell et al. (1995) suggest that parental involvement in the 
businesses is actually detrimental rather than beneficial, and is “meddling” rather than “helping” 
the business.  In the case of unrelated internal corporate venturing then, parental involvement is 
undesirable.  When a CEO gets involved in the control and management of an unrelated ICV, he 
or she may be fulfilling personal desires regarding involvement in an entrepreneurial venture, but 
may be acting to the detriment of the venture.  When this is the case, external board members 
should act to fulfill their role of control in order to “rein in “ the CEO and ensure that the 
unrelated ICV receives the degree of autonomy it requires to be successful.  Thus, we expect a 
three-way interaction between external board members, CEO tenure, and parent-venture 
relatedness in predicting venture autonomy.  The presence of external board members tends to 
correct the over-involvement of CEOs such that the relationship between parent-venture 
relatedness and venture autonomy returns to its original negative correlation. 
 
Proposition 6:  External board members and CEO tenure form a three-way interaction 
with parent-venture relatedness such that external board members regulate the 
involvement of a long-tenured CEO, so that the CEO will not “over-manage” unrelated 
ventures. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  The conceptual development presented in this manuscript provides new insight into 
factors that determine which ventures are pursued within a business and how they are pursued.  
By focusing on distinguishing features of the unique context of the family business, the 
propositions explore how the relatedness of ICVs undertaken by the family firm may change as 
new generations begin to participate in the ownership and control of the firm.  Also, the tenure of 
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the CEO and the presence of external board members are shown to influence the nature of these 
relationships. 
  The concepts presented have potentially important implications for scholars and 
practitioners.  First, the types of ICVs pursued by firms may have as much to do with the 
personalities and personal wishes involved as they do with any formal planning or opportunity 
recognition process.  Second, family firms wishing to venture into either related or unrelated 
business domains may encourage or discourage next generation participation in the family firm 
accordingly.  Third, care perhaps should be taken when allowing a CEO to get involved in the 
management of an unrelated venture; these ventures may do better if they are left as autonomous 
units rather than being subject to parent-level management. 
  Future research should consider testing similar conceptual models to the one presented 
via empirical analysis.  While difficult to access, such data may provide a wealth of information 
on the corporate venturing process, especially as it is present within family firms.  Understanding 
the nature of entrepreneurial behavior in family firms is a timely topic that merits further 
consideration. 
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